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01| Imagine a group of residents in a barrio who have decided to rebuild the place themselves. They are not asking to be helped; they have a plan, they have people willing to do the work, and what they need from government is permission, a small amount of money, and for nobody to obstruct them. They go to the municipal offices, because that is the government they can physically reach, and they explain what they intend to do. The official they meet may be sympathetic, may even

01| Suppose the plan the residents carry into the municipal office is not a wall or a water point but something slower — getting the barrio's teenagers through school and into work that pays enough to leave if they want to. The result of that plan arrives in roughly fifteen years, when today's twelve-year-olds are twenty-seven and their earnings can finally be counted. The official listening to it holds an office with a term of four or five years, and whatever he is judged on

01| The question is normally asked as a moral one — do politicians care about the poor? — and asked that way it produces nothing but argument. Asked structurally it has an answer that can be checked: politicians respond to the people who determine whether they keep their office. Whether the residents of a given barrio are among those people is an empirical matter, it varies enormously between places, and it can be established before anyone knocks on a door. This is the differ

01| Suppose the barrio knows exactly what it needs and has agreed on it. Where does it say so, to whom, and what happens to what it says on the way? The formal answer is that channels exist in abundance — consultations, public hearings, ward committees, complaint lines, the elected representative, the participation clause in the municipal statute. The empirical answer is that nearly all of them terminate in an intermediary organisation, and the intermediary, not the resident,

01| Everything so far has been about the machine. This chapter is about the encounter — one person, one office, one form — because that is where the state is actually experienced by anyone in the barrio, and because it is the one part of government performance that can be measured cleanly. The measurement is called non-take-up: the share of people who are entitled to something and do not receive it. What makes it so useful is that eligibility is not in dispute, so whatever th

So where is the context of IkoCiti? What is the world that this chapter describes? What is the theme? You start without introducing anything. You go back to the poverty measurement theme? At least that what yiu think reading Para 1/2? 01| Before a government can help a poor person it has to decide who counts as poor, and that decision is made by an instrument rather than by a judgement. The instrument has an error rate, the error rate is calculable, and it is almost never pub

01| Asking whether bureaucracy is good or bad for the poor produces nothing, because procedure is not one thing but a mechanism with two opposite effects. The useful question is which functions it protects and which it blocks, and both lists are real, neither cancelling the other. This chapter is the one most likely to be got wrong by people arriving with good intentions, because the obstacles are visible from the barrio and the protections are not. Anyone who reads procedure

01| Governments largely do not deliver services to the poor with their own staff. They contract, and the organisations they contract with are the visible face of the state in most barrios — the clinic run by a foundation, the training programme run by an NGO, the youth centre run by a church body. Understanding a government's relationship with poverty therefore means understanding its relationship with the organisations it pays, which is one of the most documented and least d

01| The preceding chapters are a catalogue of what government does badly, and read alone they would produce a false model. A picture of the state built only from its failures predicts the wrong things, most importantly that the state could be worked around. It cannot. There are functions no other actor can perform at all, and every anti-poverty effort not run by government eventually collides with one of them — usually after it has committed to a plan that assumed otherwise.